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116 EsTATE OF RADOVICH [48 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 24034. In Bank. Mar. 15, 1957.] 
Estate of JACK R. RADOVICH, Deceased. ROBERT C. 
KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Appellant, v. CITI-
ZENS NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK 
OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents. 
lb] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction-Nature.-The jurisdic-
tion of the probate court is a jurisdiction in rem, the res being 
the decedent's estate which is to be administered and dis-
tributed with regard to the rights of creditors, devisees, 
legatees and all the world. 
[2] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Nature.-An heirship proceeding 
is not an ordinary civil action but a specialized proceeding in 
rem, wherein the res is the right of heirship and distribution, 
and as to that issue the decree is binding on the whole world. 
[3] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Conclusiveness of Decree.-An 
heirship proceeding is conclusive against all persons as the 
basis for the decree of distribution which is to follow; it 
settles the rights of all persons claiming as heirs of the 
decedent whether or not they are named in the complaint or 
personally served with summons. 
[4] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Decree.-An heirship decree is not 
one in personam in favor of one of the parties against the 
other but, as founded in a specialized proceeding in rem, 
the decree, when rendered, is a solemn declaration of the 
status of the thing and ipso facto renders it what the decree 
declares it to be. 
[5] Id.-Jurisdiction-Notice.-By giving the notice prescribed by 
statute for probate proceedings, the entire world is called 
before the probate court, and the court acquires jurisdiction 
over all persons for the purpose of determining their rights 
to any portion of the estate, and every person who may assert 
any right or interest therein is required to present his claim 
to the court for its determination. 
[6] !d.-Distribution-Effect of Decree-Persons Concluded.-
Where the requisite statutory notice for probate proceedings 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 18 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 23 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 659 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, §§ 14, 24; [2] 
Decedents' I~states, § 982; [3, 9] Decedents' E'states, § 991; [ 4, 8, 
12] Decedents' Estates, § 989; [5] Decedents' Estates, § 22; [6] 
Decedents' J<jstates, § 1055; [7] Taxation, § 411; [10] Decedents' 
Estates, §§ 986.1, 989; [11] Taxation, § 424(3). 
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has been a decree of distribution 1s binding on au 
interested person who fails to appear and his claim 
as on one whose claim, after presentation, has been disallowed 
the court. 
f7] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Nature.-The tax 
the Inheritance Tax Law is on the right to succeed to property 
of the estate, rather than on the property itself. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Effect, of Decree.-
vVhere an heirship decree adjudges that a person over the age 
of 21 years was in equity the adopted son of decedent and 
therefore entitled to succeed to decedent's property as an heir, 
the State Controller may not claim that, in absence of stat-
utory adoption proceedings, he inherits as a stranger. 
(9] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Conclusiveness of Decree.-Al-
though the probate court's conclusion in hPirship proceedings 
as to a person's right to inherit ns the adopted son of decedent 
may have been erroneous, where it was reached in an action in 
rem which has become final it is binding in subsequent in-
heritance tax proceedings. 
[10] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Parties: Effect of Decree.--The 
state is not a proper party to an heirship procPeding (Proh. 
Code, § 1080 et seq.), but this does not preclude an heirship 
decree as to a person's right to inherit as an adopted son of 
the decedent from being binding on the state. 
[11] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Exemptions Based on Re-
lationship.-Only an heir may inherit; and where a person 
who was taken into decedent's home pursuant to an agreement 
with the parents that he would be considered decedent's 
son was not a grantee, donee, vendee, assignee or beneficiary 
of decedent, but for purposes of probating the estate was 
adjudged in heirship procePdings to be in equity an adopted 
son of decedent, he took decedent's estate as an adopted child 
and heir and hence was a Class A transferee under Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 13307, sub d. (h), providing that such a trans-
feree is one whose relationship to decedent is that of a child 
adopted by decedent in conformity with state laws. 
[12] Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Effect of Decree. 
-Where an inheritance tax to be levied depends in the first 
instance on the probate court's findings as to heirship and a 
person's right to succeed to decedent's estate, a finding that 
such person had the equitable status of an adopted son of 
decedent and was entitled to the estate is binding on the state 
as well as on all others. 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Inheritance and Gift Taxes, § 2; Am.Jur., 
Inheritance, Estate and Gift Taxes, § 9 et seq. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County sustaining objections to report of inheritance 
tax appraiser and which fixed an inheritance tax. Victor R. 
Hansen, Judge. Affirmed. 
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, \Valter 
II. Miller, Chief Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney, "William 
R Elam and Milton A. Huot, Assistant Inheritance Tax 
Attorneys, for Appellant. 
Louis 'l'homas Hiller, Nat \Vilk, Seudder & ForrlA and 
George A. Forde for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal by the Controller of the 
State of California from a judgment of the suprrior court, 
sitting in probate, which sustained respondent Grorge Rado-
vich's objections to the report of the inheritance tax appraiser 
and which fixed the inheritance tax on the estate of ,Jack R. 
Radovich, deceased. 
The facts are not in dispute. 
In 1934, when George Vukoye (now legally known as George 
Radovich) was 17 years of age, his natural parents entered 
into an oral agreement with the decedent, Jack R. Radovich, 
whereby George was to live with Jack who promised that he 
would consider George his son and would adopt him. George 
lived with Jack until Jack's death in October, 1953, changed 
his name to George Radovich and was publicly acknowledged 
by Jack as his son and the heir to his estate. During the 
time George lived with Jack, he worked in Jack's liquor 
store, conducted himself as a natural child and considered 
himself the son of Jack. Jack died intestate without having 
married or leaving issue of his body. He left no father or 
mother surviving him but did leave some blood relatives in 
Yugoslavia.* Jack had not, during his lifetime, instituted 
formal proceedings for the adoption of George. 
On the death of Jack, the Citizens National Trust and 
Savings Bank of Los Angeles and Novak D. Novcic, a nephew 
of the decedent, were appointed as coadministrators of Jack's 
estate. On .Tune 14, 1954, George filed a petition in the pro-
bate proceeding to determine his heirship in the estate of 
,Tack. After a hearing, .Judge ,John Gee Clark made findings 
*George agreed in writing to transfer and assign $55,000 of the 
eHtatP to the blood relatives in Yugoslavia. 
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(whicl_yincludrd the.facts her:to~ore se~ forth) an? concluded 
that ~George I{adoviCh occupies m eqmty the eqmtable status 
of an adopted son and by reason thereof is entitled to dis-
tribution of all of the Estate of the decedent.'' A decree 
was then entered on the findings of fact to the effect that 
George had the equitable status of an adopted son of the 
decedent and was entitled to all of the estate (with the 
exception of the sum transferred to the relatives in Yugo-
slavia). Although the heirship proceeding was contested no 
appeal was taken and that decree is now final/ 
Subsequent to the decree of the probate court, an inherit-
ance tax appraiser was appointed who filed his report claiming 
that George H.adovich was a stranger in blood to the decedent 
and that he should be allowed a specific exemption of $50 
as a Class D transferee and computing the inheritance tax 
due at the rate of a stranger under sections 13310 and 13407 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The bank, Novak Novcic, 
and George filed objections to the report of the inheritanee 
tax appraiser under section 14510 of the Revenue and Tax-
ation Code. A hearing was had before Judge Hansen who 
filed findings of faet, eonelusions of law and a memorandum 
opinion and signed a judgment determining that George was 
a Class A transferee (adopted ehild). This appeal followed 
that judgment. 
The only question involved here and one whieh is of first 
impression in this state is whether under the facts presented 
George is a Class A transferee. Seetion 13307 of the Revenue 
and Taxation Code provides that a Class A transferee is 
'' (b) A transferee whose relationship to the deeedent is that 
of a child adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws 
of this State, provided such child was under the age of 21 
years at the time of such adoption." 
It is contended by appellant that since George was not 
adopted in conformity with the statutory requirements of 
this state that he takes as a stranger and only because of the 
eontract made by his natural parents with the decedent. Re-
spondents contend that the heirship proceeding in which it 
was declared that George was, in equity, the adopted son of 
the decedent is a final judgment in rem which is binding on 
the appellant and all others. It is also argued by respondents 
that the words of the statute "adopted by the decedent in 
conformity with the laws of this state" (emphasis added) 
should be construed to mean not only in conformity with the 
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law of this state but the law as set forth by a decision 
of a court of jurisdidion. Hespondents also argue 
that George took the money by inhet·itance; that a stranger 
may not inherit; that it was only by reason of his inheritance 
that George is subject to an inheritance tax. 
[la, 2] This court has held (Estate of Wise, 34 Cal.2d 
376 [210 P.2d 497]) that the jurisdiction of the probate court 
is a jurisdiction in rem; that an heirship proceeding is not 
an civil action, but a specialized proceeding in rem. 
The res is the right of heirship and distribution and as to that 
issue the decree is binding on the whole world. [3] We said 
there that "so it has been said that such heirship 'decree [is] 
eonclnsive against all persons' as the 'basis for the decree 
of distribution which [is] to follow' (Estate of Blythe, 110 
Cal. 231, 234 [42 P. 643]); it settles 'the rights of all persons 
claiming as heirs of the decedent, whether or not they are 
uamed in the complaint or personally served with summons' 
(Title & Docmnent Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 
307 [88 P. 356, 119 Am.St.Hep. 199, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 682]) .... 
[ 4] rrhe decree is not one 'in personam in favor of one of 
the parties against another.' (Edlund v. Superior Coud, 209 
Cal. 690, 695 [289 P. 841].) Hather, as founded in a special-
ized proceeding in rem-' not against persons as such, but 
against or upon the thing or subject matter itself'-the decree, 
when rendered, 'is a solemn declaration of the status of the 
thing, and ipso facto renders it what the [decree] declares 
it to be.' ( 11A Cal.J ur. § 73, p. 135, and cases there cited.) 
While it may 'not be questioned that justice and sound policy 
n;t!uire that the estates of decedents be distributed to persons 
rightfully entitled thereto and that every concern and en-
deavor of a probate court should be to the accomplishment 
of that purpose,' that does not mean that a 'valid decree' 
determinative of rights 'of distribution ... when once final, 
may be disturbed at the behest of any rightful claimant, 
known or unknown, when the decree was rendered, for it is 
the well-settled policy of the law to preserve the inviolability 
of final judgments and decrees of courts of law and equity, 
and a valid decree of a court of probate partakes of the nature 
of such judgments.' (Edlund v. Snperior Court, supra, 209 
Cal. 690, 695.)" (See also 29 Cal.Jur.2d § 294, p. 273.) 
Section 1908, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that the effect of a judgment or final order is as 
follows: ''In case of a judgment or order against a specific 
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in to the probate of a will, or the admi nistra-
tion of the estate of a decedent, or in to the personal, 
politieal, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, 
the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the 
thing, the will, or administration, or the condition or relation 
of the person." [1b] In Abels v. 126 Cal.App. 48, 
53 [14 P.2d 594], it was held: "The of the pro-
bate court is a jurisdiction in rem, the res being the estate 
of the decedent which is to he administered and distributcrl 
with regard to tbe rights of creditors, devisees, legatees and 
all the world. (Warren Y. Ellis, 39 Cal.App. 542 [179 P. 
644] ; Nicholson v. Leatham, 28 Cal.App. 5D7 [153 P. 965, 155 
P. 98].) [5] By giving the notiee prescribed by the stat-
ute, the entire world is callc(l before the court, and tlw court 
acquires jurisdiction over all persons for the purpose of detrr-
mining thrir rightR to any portio11 of the and every 
person who may assert any right or interest therein is 
required to present his claim to the court for its determination. 
'Whether he appears and presents his claim, or fails to appear, 
the action of the court is equally conelusive upon him, ' "sub-
ject only to be[ing] reversed, set aside, or modified on 
appeal.'' ' [6] The decree is as binding upon him if he 
fails to appear and present his claim, as if his claim, after 
presmtation, had been disallowed by the court. (1Villiarn 
Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359 [48 P. 323]; J11ulcahey v. 
Dow, 131 Cal. 73 [63 P. 158]; Hanley v. Hanley, supra [114 
Cal. G90 ( 46 P. 736)].) " (See also Bath v. Valdez, 70 Cal. 
350, 361 [11 P. 724]; Barnard v. Wilson, 74 Cal. 512, 5]6 [16 
~07]; Howell v. Buclcl, 91 Cal. 342, 349, 350 [27 P. 747] .) 
• In the heirship proceedings, it was adjudged that George 
was entitled to inherit all of ,Jack's estate, and for the pur-
poses of probating the estate he was adjudged to he in eqniiy 
''an adopted son.'' That determination has long ;;inee breome 
finaL/ 
[7] In Estate of Bloom, 213 Cal. 575, 580 [2 P.2d 753], 
it was held that the tax imposed by the Inheritanee Tax La~, .. 
is on the right to succeed to the property of the rstate, rather 
than upon the property itself. (Estate of Letchworth, 201 
Cal. 1 [255 P. 195] .) [8] The heirship decree adjudging 
that George was, in equity, the adopted son of Jack, and 
therefore entitled to succeed to his property, as an heir, was 
the basis for the imposition of the inheritance tax. Inasmuch 
as George takes Jack's estate only by reason of the adjudica-
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tion of his status as Jack's adopted son and heir, it appears 
that appellant may not claim that he inherits as a stranger. 
[9] The conclusion of the trial court sitting in probate as 
to George's right to inherit as the adopted son of Jack may 
have been erroneous but it was an action in rem which is now 
final. In Estate of Dattghaclay, 168 Cal. 63 [141 P. 929], it 
was held that even if a decree establishing title under the 
McEnerney Act was mistaken in fact, it nevertheless stood 
as a conclusive adjudication in rrm binding upon the whole 
world. In Woods v. Secnrity-First Nat. Bank, 46 Cal.2d 
697, 703, 704 [299 P.2d 657], where the plaintiff had insti-
tuted heirship proceedings and where the court's decision 
had become final "long before the commencement of the 
present action," we held that "Whatever reasoning prompted 
the court in arriving at its conclusion that the plaintiff was 
entitled to one-half is not now important. The court had the 
right to decide the question at issue, as the plaintiff in assert-
ing that he was an heir was thereby claiming through the 
estate and not adversely to it. (Central Bank v. Sttperior 
Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 16-17 [285 P.2d 906] .) It mattered not 
whether the court sitting in probate found the property to 
be community or separate. It had the power to decide the 
question of heirship presented in the petition and the deter-
mination therein is res judicata." 
[10] Appellant contends that the probate decree as to 
George's right to inherit as an adopted son is not binding 
upon the state inasmuch as the state could not have been a 
party to the heirship proceeding. Appellant's argument that 
the state was not a proper party to the heirship proceeding 
is quite correct (Pro b. Code, § § 1080 et seq.) but it appears, 
also, that the appellant's argument is inconsistent with its 
attempt to tax the inheritance here involved by classifying 
George as a stranger (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13310). Section 
13306 defines ''transferee'' as any person to whom a transfer 
is made, and includes any legatee, devisee, heir, next of kin, 
grantee, donee, vendee, assignee, successor, survivor, or bene-
ficiary. Section 13307 defines Class A transferees as a hus-
band, wife, lineal ancestor, or lineal issue of the decedent, 
or an adopted child, or a transferee to whom the decedent 
stood in the mutually acknowledged relationship of a parent 
for not less than 10 years prior to the transfer if the rela-
tionship commenced on or before the transferee's fifteenth 
birthday, or the lineal issue of a child of the adopted child, 
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or the mutually acknowledged child of the decedent. Sec-
tion 13808 defines Class B transferees as the brother, sis-
or descendant of a brother or sister of the decedent, 
or the descendant of a brother or sister of the father or 
mother of the decedent. Class D transferees are defined by 
section 13310 as any transferee who is not in any of the 
(:lasses above mentioned. [11] Since only an heir may in-
herit and since George was not a grantee, donee, vendee, 
assignee, or beneficiary of Jack, it follows that in view of the 
probate decree he took ,Jack's estate as his adopted child and 
lwir ( § 1:3307, subd. (b)) and appellant's argume11t must fail. 
Although no case directly in point has been cited to us, nor 
has independent research rm.·eal(•d any, it has been held in a 
proceeding under the aet of 1889 which supplemented the 
Wright Irrigation Act, that the confirmation of the validity 
of an organization of an irrigation district and the bonds 
issued thereby was a procerding in rem and that the judg-
m('nt therein bound the whole world, including the state 
(People v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist., 128 Cal. 477 [61 P. 86] ). 
(See also People v. Perris Irr. Dist., 132 Cal. 289 [64 P. 
i399, 77i3J; and 29 Cal.Jur.2c1 § 296, p. 276.) It has also been 
held (Brooks v. United States, 84 F'.Supp. 622) that the de-
cree of a California court of general jurisdiction which found 
that half of the community property was the property of the 
decedent and that the other half should be distributed to his 
surviving widow as her half, was binding on the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue in determining plaintiff's community 
interests. [12] It clearly appears that since the inheritance 
tax to be levied depended in the first instance on the probate 
court's findings as to heirship and George's right to succeed 
to the property (Estate of Letchworth, 201 Cal. 1 r255 P. 
195]), such finding must be binding on the state as well as 
on all others. vYe said in In re Miller, 31 Cal.2d 191, 199 
[187 P.2d 722], in speaking of the Inheritance Tax Act of 
19:35, that "As with a succession statute, death is the 'gener-
ating source' for the operation of the inheritance tax, con-
sistent with the commonly accepted theory that such tax is 
imposed on the right to receive a decedent's property. (28 
Am.Jur. §§ 9 and 10, p. 12.) While such tax is assessed upon 
the value of property so transmitted, the rates and exemptions 
are based upon the relationship of the recipient to the de-
cedent. (28 Am.Jur. § 4, p. 9.) Accordingly, a cardinal 
purpose of the inheritance tax law would be to coordinate 
its assessment as closely as possible with the substantive pro-
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bate law regulating the distribution of the decedent's estate." 
It follows from what we have heretofore said regarding 
the conclusive nature of the decree with respect to the status 
of George in the heirship proceeding, that the judgment ap-
pealed from must be, and is, affirmed. 
Gibson, C. 
curred. 
Shenk, Traynor, J., and Spence, ;r., con-
SCHAuER, J., Dissenting.-In my view the majority 
opinion errs in holding that the decree in the so-called heir-
ship proceeding is conelusive as to the tax proceeding and 
that the argument of the State Controller constitutes an 
attack on the heirship decree. Because such opinion may well 
be cited for far-reaching effects in the future I deem it proper 
to record here the principal arguments against it. 
If established principles were adhered to, this appeal should 
be resolved primarily by application of pertinent sections of 
the California Inheritance rrax Law (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13301 et seq.) and secondarily on the statutory and de-
cisional law of adoption. Applying the tax law consistently 
with the adoption law leads to the conclusion that George 
Radovich should be regarded, for purposes of assessing the 
inheritance tax, as a Class D rather than a Class A trans-
feree. More specifically, it will appear from the facts and 
law hereinafter elucidated, that the very decree which George 
relies on as adjudicating his Class A status, conclusively 
establishes facts leading to the conclusion that he is in Class 
D. Hence, the judgment appealed from should be reversed. 
Following the death of Jack Radovich, George Radovich 
petitioned the probate court for a "Decree Determining In-
terests" in the decedent's estate. The court in that pro-
ceeding found that the decedent had died intestate, and had 
left no surviving spouse, issue, descendants of any deceased 
child, or parents; however, that decedent had left surviving 
him certain brothers and sisters and their descendants, all 
but one of whom are residents of Yugoslavia. 
The court further found that ''the decedent and the natural 
parents of George Radovich, and George Radovich, then 
known as George Vukoye and17 years of age, entered into an 
oral agreement in the year 1934 . . . [under the terms of 
which] the decedent promised and agreed that if said George 
Radovich would go to live with decedent and be decedent's 
son, decedent would give to said George Radovich all of the 
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of a natural son of decedent and would regard said 
Radovich as decedent's own son and that he would 
said George Radovich"; that George's natural parents, 
in reliance upon the agreement, relinquished to decedent all 
of their rights in George as natural parents; that George 
accepted the oral agreement and immediately went to live 
with decedent and thereafter, until decedent's death in 1953, 
performed all of the duties of a child towards a parent; that 
during the period in which George resided with the decedent, 
the decedent publicly acknowledged George as his own son 
and heir to his estate, but he "did not institnte any statutory 
J?roeeedings for adoption of said George Radovich; ... [and 
that] pursuant to said or·al agreement and his [George's] 
performance thereof, and by reason of the failure of decedent 
to fully perform the obligations assumed by him to be per-
formed under said oral agreement, George Radovich occupies 
in equity the eq1l.itable status of an acloptecl son ancl by 
reason the1·eof is entitled to dist1·ibntion of all of the Estate of 
the decedent, except that portion thereof which [George 
agreed to transfer to the Yugoslavian relatives]." (Italics 
added.) The court ordered a distribution of the estate in 
accordance with this latter finding. Such distribution was 
made, and the court order has since become final. 
The inheritance tax appraisers determined that George i;;; 
a stranger to the blood of the decedent, and assessed the in-
heritance tax based on the amount of the estate passing to 
George at the rate and with the exemption applicable to 
strangers in blood. George, claiming to be entitled to the 
more beneficial tax rate and exemption accorded to an adopted 
child, objected to this assessment, and instituted the present 
proceeding. The trial court found (more accurately, con-
cluded, in the proceeding now before us on direct attack) 
that under the decree of the probate court, ''George Rado-
vich was able to succeed to the decedent's estate and be dis-
tributed the property of said estate, only by virtue of the 
rstablishment of his status as an adopted son, and that the 
said George Radovich inherited the property from the said 
estate as a result of having the status of an adopted son'' ; 
and that "the determination of the Probate Court that said 
George Radovich had the status of an adopted son of the 
decedent was the determination that said George Radovich 
was adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws of 
this state when under the age of 21 years." The court con-
cluded that George, as an adopted son, was a Class A trans-
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feree under the inheritance tax statutes and should be taxed 
accordingly. 
As is hereinafter developed, the "findings" of the trial 
court in this proceeding that the court sitting in exercise of 
probate jurisdiction had decreed that George had been 
adopted in conformity with the laws of this state while under 
the age of 21 years, that his status as a lawfully adopted 
son was established, and that he inherited the decedent's estate 
as an adopted son, are untenable as a matter of law. More-
over, the following analysis of the controlling inheritance tax 
statutes, in the light of the findings and decree in the heirship 
proceeding, appears to me to demonstrate that George has the 
status of a Class D, rather than a Class A, transferee. 
Inheritance tax is imposed upon the right to succeed to 
the property of the estate rather than upon the property it-
self (Estate of Bloom (1931), 213 Cal. 575, 580 [4] 12 P.2d 
753]), and is imposed not merely upon the passing of prop-
erty by inheritance or under a will, but upon "every transfer" 
subject to the inheritance tax statutes (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13401). It is intended that the passing of "any property" 
from the estate of a decedent be subject to the tax imposed 
(see Hev. & Tax. Code, § 13304), and the amount of tax is 
determined by the relationship of the transferee to the de-
cedent (In re Miller (1947), 31 Cal.2d191, 199 [4] [187 P.2d 
722] ) . A transferee is "any person to whom a transfer is 
made, and includes any legatee, devisee, heir, next of kin, 
grantee, donee, vendee, assignee, successor, survivor, or bene-
ficiary." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13306.) The statute specifics 
four different classes of transferees; a Class A transferee in-
cludes one "whose relationship to the decedent is that of a 
child adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws 
of this State, provided such child was under the age of 21 
years at the time of such adoption.'' (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13307, subd. (b).) 
George Hadovich was a transferee within the meaning of 
the above stated rules, and as such the transfer to him was 
subject to the tax. Under the facts of this case it is clear 
that if George is not a Class A transferee as an adopted son 
then he is a Class D transferee as a stranger to the blood of 
the decedent. Thus, the sole question to be determined is 
whether, within the meaning of the controlling tax statute, 
George can be classified as an adopted son for purposes of 
computation of the applicable tax. 
A statutory grant of exemption from taxation is "strictly 
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to the end that such concession will be neither en-
nor extended beyond the plain meaning of the language 
" (Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los 
(1950), :-\5 Cal.2d 729, 734 [1] [221 P.2d 31, 15 
A.L.H.2d 10±5] ; see also Cypress Lawn C. Assn. v. San Fran-
cisco ( 1931), 211 Cal. 387, 390 [1] [295 P. 813] .) While 
it has been held that the rule of strict construction of statu-
tory in favor of the state does not apply to the 
rate sections of the Inheritance 'I'ax Law (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
~·~ 13401-13404) (Estate of Morris (1943), 56 Cal.App.2d 
7iG, 727 [5] [133 P.2d 452]), such rule does apply to the 
exemption sections (Rev. & 'l'ax. Code, §§ 13801-13804) 
(Estate of Stcchler (1925), 195 Cal. 386, 396 [3] [233 P. 
972]). Since the various classes of transferees are accorded 
different tax treatment under both the rate and exemption 
statutes (e.g., a transferee included in Class A is taxed in 
accordance with both the Class A rates (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ J 3401) and the Class A exemption (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13801) ) , it follows that the two types of statutes should be 
eonstrued ·in pari maten:a (see In re Newberry's Estate 
(1953), 138 W.Va. 296 [75 S.E.2d 851, 852 [1], 40 A.L.R.2d 
624 J ) , and the same rule (whether of strict or of liberal con-
struction) should be applied to each type. 
It is established that succession to the property of a decedent 
is a privilege, not an inherent right, and that the various 
states have plenary power over property subject to inheri-
tance. (See Stebbins v. Riley (1925), 268 U.S. 137 [45 S.Ct. 
424, 69 hEd. 884, 44 A.hR. 1454]; Magmtn v. Illinois Trust 
& Sav. Bank (1898), 170 U.S. 283 [18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 
1037] ; United States v. Perkins (1896), 163 U.S. 625, 629-630 
116 S.Ct. 1073, 41 L.Ed. 287].) Thus a succession tax stat-
ute may constitutionally impose a tax on transfers in which 
the rate does not vary with the relationship of the trans-
feree to the decedent, and which does not allow any exemp-
tions at all based on relationship. (E.g., see the statutes of 
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stats., § 42-1510) ; Florida (Fla. Stats., 
§ 198.02); and Mississippi (Miss. Code, § 9264).) Since the 
fixing of different rates and exemptions among classes based 
on degree of relationship is thus a matter of legislative grace, 
not required by or obnoxious to either federal or state Con-
stitutions (see Estate of Watkinson (1923), 191 Cal. 591, 
597-598 [3-5] [217 P. 1073]; Estate of Potter (1922), 188 
Cal. 55, 63 [ 6-7] [204 P. 826]), it follows that both the rate 
and exemption statutes should properly be considered as 
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subject to the rule that statutory tax concessions are to be 
eonstrued liberally in favor of the state and strictly against 
these claiming the indulgence offered. 
Were it not for the specific provisions of seetion 13307, 
subdivision (b), of the Revenue and Taxation Code (quoted 
ante, p. 119), classifying a child adopted in conformity with 
the laws of this state as a Class A transferee, such adopted 
child would be subject to inheritance tax at the rates and 
exemption applicable to strangers. (See In re Strunk's 
Estate (1952), 369 Pa. 478 [87 A.2d 485, 487]; 28 Am.Jur. 
102, § 196.) Although the beneficial tax status of a natural 
child has been extended in California to children legally 
adopted while under the age of 21, neither this extension nor 
the actual adoption can obliterate the fact that genetically 
such children are strangers to the blood of the foster parents. 
(See Estate of Kruse (1953), 120 Cal.App.2d 254, 257 [260 
P.2d 969]; see also In re Da1·ling (1916), 173 Cal. 221 [159 
P. 606] .) Indisputably, an adjudication that a child bears 
the equitable status of an adopted child does not effect a 
change in the child's actual status of a blood stranger to the 
adoptive parent. The provisions of section 13307, subdivision 
(b), extend the beneficial rates and exemptions of sections 
13401 and 13801 only to children adopted in conformity with 
California law. Adoption is purely statutory in origin and 
nature, and there cannot be an adoption without compliance 
with the statutory requirements. (Matter of Cozza (1912), 
163 Cal. 514, 522 [126 P. 161, Ann. Cas. 1914A 214] .) There 
can be neither an equitable adoption (see In re Olson's Estate 
(1955), 244 Minn. 449 [70 N.W.2d 107, 110]) nor an adoption 
by estoppel (Adoption of Parker (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 608, 617 
19] [191 P.2d 420] ). If the rule of strict construction of 
tax exemption statutes is applied here, then it must be con-
eluded that the Class A exemption and rate statutes cannot be 
extended to include a child not legally adopted, even though 
he bears the "equitable status" of an adopted child. 
It appears to me, from the foregoing discussion, that the 
only way George Radovich could lawfully become entitled 
to the status of a Class A transferee would be to establish that 
he was ''adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws 
of this State, provided [he] was under the age of 21 years 
at the time of such adoption." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13307, 
subd. (b).) As noted above, adoption is purely statutory 
in origin and to be valid must conform to the applicable stat-
utes; here the findings and decree relied on by George to 
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his equitable right to the transfer of decedent's 
likewise establish that decedent ''did not institute 
any statutory proceedings :for adoption.'' 'l'he only proceed-
relied on to give George the status of an adopted child 
is the probate proceeding to determine interests in the estate 
of the decedent. That decree was not entered until George 
was 37 years of age. 
It is urged that the "laws of this State" contemplated 
by section 13307, subdivision (b) of the Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code include not only the statutory law but also the de-
cisional law, and that the decree of the probate court there-
fore satisfies the requisites of the tax statute. Even assuming 
that the probate decree declaring that George had the equitable 
status of an adopted son was tantamount to a decree of 
adoption in conformity with the laws of this state, it is obvious 
that George still does not qualify for Class A. exemption status 
within the terms of section 13307, subdivision (b) because 
the proceeding relied on to give George an adopted status 
doe:;; not bring him within the age-at-adoption qualification. 
Manifestly, the conclusion that George at the age of 37 was 
by virtue of private contract in the equitable position of an 
adopted son, cannot accomplish his legal or equitable adoption 
before the age of 21. 
Ko California case directly in point has been cited by the 
parties, nor has any been discovered by independent research, 
on the question of the effect of an equitable decree such as in 
the present c~se on the status taxwise of the child involved. 
However, there is substantial authority from other jurisdic-
tions which supports the conclusion that the probate decree 
did not adjudicate that George was either the adopted son 
or the legal heir of the decedent. These authorities establish 
the following general principles: 
"[A]n adoption can be brought about only by a following 
of the statutory procedure therefor; consequently, a mere 
executory agreement to adopt, with nothing more, is not an 
adoption, and the child is not an heir of the parties agreeing 
to adopt it" (2 C.J.S. 399, § 27; Parnelle v. Cavanaugh 
(1941), 191 Ga. 464 [12 S.E.2d 877, 878 [1]); Malaney v. 
Cameron (1916), 99 Kan. 70,71 [161 P. 1180,1181 [1]]), 
for the right to take as an heir exists only by operation of law 
(O'Connor v. Patton (1926), 171 Ark. 626 [286 S.W. 822, 
826]; Jordan v. Abney (1904), 97 Tex. 296 [78 S.W. 486, 
4891), and cannot be created by contract (Wiseman v. 
48 C.2d-5 
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Guernsey (1922), 107 Neb. 647 [187 N.W. 55, 56 [1]]; Couch 
v. Couch (1951), 35 Tenn.App. 464 [248 S.W.2d 327, 334 
[5]]) or by estoppel (Glass v. Glass (1952, Ohio), 125 N.E.2d 
375, 377 [3, 4]). However, under the principle that equity 
will consider that done which ought to have been done, it is 
generally held that a contract by a person to adopt the child 
of another as his own, accompanied by a virtual, although 
not a statutory adoption, may be enforced upon the death of 
the obligor by adjudging the child entitled to a natural child's 
share in the property of an obligor dying intestate. (2 C.J.S. 
400, § 27, and cases cited therein.) "In upholding such a 
remedy, the courts do not hold that the child is entitled to 
the right of inheritance as an heir. They do not undertake 
to change the status of either party, but merely to enforce a 
contract which has been fully performed on one side." (2 
C.J.S. 401, § 27; In re P.ainter's Estate (1954), 246 Iowa 307 
[67 N.W.2d 617, 619]; Hickox v. Johnston (1923), 113 Kan. 
99 [213 P. 1060, 1061, 27 A.L.R. 1322]; Starnes v. Hatcher 
(1908), 121 Tenn. 330 [117 S.W. 219, 223]; but see Crawford 
v. Wilson (1913), 139 Ga. 654 [78 S.E. 30, 32 [1], 44 L.R.A. 
N.S. 773]; Lynn v. Hockaday (1901), 162 Mo. 111 [61 S.W. 
885, 889, 85 Am.St.Rep. 480] .) When the child takes prop-
erty in such a case it is as a purchaser by virtue of the con-
tract (Couch v. Couch (1951, Tenn.), supra, 248 S.W.2d 327, 
334 [6]) and by way of damages or specific performance 
(Minetree v. Minetree (1930), 181 Ark. 111 [26 S.W.2d 101, 
104 [3]]; Miller v. Elliot (1943), 266 App.Div. 428 [42 N.Y.S. 
2d 569, 570]). The child does not become, in a legal sense, the 
child of the adopting parents except for the purpose of re-
ceiving title to their property (Besche v. Murphy (1948), 190 
Md. 539 [59 A.2cl499, 504 [9, 10]]) and is not entitled to let-
ters of administration (State ex rel. Balshaw v. Montgomery 
(1940), 237 Mo.App. 678 [146 S.W.2d 129, 132]). The child 
shares in the estate of the deceased foster parent as though 
his own child but not as such. In order to do justice and 
equity, as far as possible, to one who, though having filled 
the place of a natural born child, through inadvertence or 
fault has not been legally adopted, the court enforces a con-
tract under which the child is entitled to property, declaring 
that as a consideration on the part of the foster parents a 
portion of their property will pass on their death to the child. 
( Chehak v. Battles (1907), 133 Iowa 107 [110 N.W. 330, 
335, 12 Ann. Cas. 140, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 1130] .) And in such 
case, property recompense is generally measured in the amount 
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fixed by the statutes of descent and distribution. (Caulfield 
v. Noonan (1940), 229 Iowa 955 [295 N.W. 466, 471 [1]]; 
Hickox v. Johnston (1924), 115 Kan. 845 [224 P. 905, 907]; 
1 Am.Jur. 631, § 20.) But in the absence of statutory adop-
tion, it cannot be held that by enforcing such a contract a 
legal adoption was effected (Roberts v. Sutton (1947), 317 
J\Iich. 458 [27 N.W.2d 54, 57-58 [3, 4]]; In re Olson's Estate 
(1955), supra, 244 Minn. 449 [70 N.W.2d 107, 110 [2-4]]; 
Franks v. Horrigan (1930), 120 Neb. 1 [231 N.W. 27, 29] ), or 
that the child became an heir, even where the contract pro-
vided for a right of inheritance ( Cmtlfield v. Noonan, supra; 
Ghehak v. Battles, supra). (For compilation and analysis of 
authorities from many jurisdictions on the subject of'' Specific 
performance of, or status of child under, contract to adopt 
not fully performed,'' and the possible applicability therein 
of the doctrine of estoppel, see notes in 171 A.L.R. 1315, 1326; 
142 A.lJ.R. 84, 122; 27 A.L.R. 1325, 1365.) 
Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, it 
becomes clear that the order of the probate court adjudicated 
no more than that by reason of the contract between the 
decedent and George's natural parents, and what was done 
by the latter and by George toward performing it, George be-
came entitled to succeed to the decedent's estate to the same 
extent that he would have taken had he been legally adopted. 
In order to do equity, the probate court enforced the contract 
insofar as property rights were concerned, but the order did 
not declare George to be an heir or purport to change his 
lega.l status; George remained a legal stranger for such things 
as inheritance tax. The "finding" of the trial court in this 
proceeding that the only way George could inherit was as an 
adopted child, and that he must therefore be treated as such 
for inheritance tax purposes, falls because George does not 
either in fact or in law take as an heir. He takes because of 
the contract performed by him and his parents and the breach 
thereof by decedent. 
Despite the fact that approximately 40 other jurisdictions 
have inheritance tax statutes similar to those in California, 
whereby a legally adopted child is allowed a higher exemp-
tion and taxed at a lower rate than ordinarily applies to 
strangers to the blood of the decedent, only three cases have 
been found which have considered a problem similar to that 
before us here. All three of those cases support the con-
clusions heretofore reached. 
In the case of In re Clark's Estate (1937), 105 Mont. 401 
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[74 P.2d 401, 412 [18], 114 .A.I.J.R. 496], there had been a 
contract to adopt the child, but the legal adoption had newr 
been completed. The child was left certain property by the 
will of the foster parent, and the inheritance tax authoritirs 
assessed the child on the basis that he was a stranger to the 
blood of the decedent. The child claimed that he was entitled 
to the more beneficial tax treatment accorded to a "child 
adopted as such in conformity with law'' (lliiont.Hev. Codes 
1935, § 10400.2 [now Mont.Rev. Codes, § 91-4409] ), by 
virtue of the contract of adoption, fully performed on his 
part. The court reviewed the general rules -vvith respect to 
contracts of adoption (as cited ante), and concluded that the 
trial court had correctly held that, whether or not the child 
could have enforced the contract against the estate of the 
decedent, he was not ''a child adopted as such in conformity 
with law," and the determination of the taxing authorities 
was sustained. 
In Lamb's Estate v. Mor-row (1908), 140 Iowa 89 [117 N.W. 
1118, 18 hR..A.N.S. 226], the recipient of property from 
the decedent claimed that he was entitled to the more favor-
able tax treatment accorded to an adopted child. He argued 
that although he had not been legally adopted, he had been 
equitably adopted, and that in fixing the tax the equitable as-
pects of the case should be considered. The court stated, be-
ginning at page 1120: ''The answer to this is that the case 
is not in equity, and if it were, the matters relied on cannot 
make one an heir if in fact they do not in law establish that 
relation .... Holmes docs not, in any event, take as an heir." 
The same answer is equally applicable to the contentions of the 
child here. 
In Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Com. (1941), 230 Iowa 797 
[298 N.W. 922, 141 .A.L.R. 1298], the child had not been 
adopted under statutory procedure, but claimed to have been 
adopted by estoppel. It was conceded that the foster parents 
were estopped to deny the adoption. Property passed to the 
child under the will of a foster parent, and the question was 
whether the child was entitled to have the transfer assessed 
at the lower inheritance tax rates and higher exemption ap-
plicable to a "legally adopted child ... entitled to inherit 
under the laws of this state." (Code of Iowa 1939, § 7313 
rnow Iowa Code, § 450.10] .) After reviewing the authorities, 
the court stated: 
"The conclusion that Grace S. Wooster was not a legally 
adouted child of Delia B. \Vooster appears inescapable. She 
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, 1d not have the status of an adopted child or any right of 
mheritanee as sueh. A decree establishing her rights in the 
property of the deceased foster parents could not have 
dwnged her previous status to that of an adopted child. The 
principle ilwolved in such equitable proceedings is property 
recompense measured in the amount fixed in the statutes of 
descent and distribution ... 
'' .L\ppellee argues that the state is in such privity with 
Delia B. Wooster as to be bound by the estoppel against her. 
1n support of this contention it is said that the state allows 
the party to fix the status of the child and should be bound 
the status so fixed by its authority. With this statement 
\le do not agree. 'rhe state, through its legislative enact-
ments, allovYS the status of an adopted child to be fixed by 
one method only, to wit, by statutory adoption. When such 
status has been thus fixed the legally adopted child becomes 
entitled to the exemption and classification provided by statute 
for property passing to a legally adopted child. Obviously, 
when a party fails to take the steps required by the state to 
effectuate a legal adoption the estoppel against such party 
resulting from such noncompliance with the statute does not 
bar the state from standing upon the facts as they actually 
exist in making classifications for inheritance tax purposes. 
"Nor do we agree that a decree establishing appellee's 
rights would constitute a judgment in rem determining her 
status which would be binding upon the taxing authorities. 
One reason for this is that appellee never had the status of 
au adopted child and the courts 'do not undertake to change 
the status.' Such decree would merely establish her property 
rights." (Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Corn. (1941, Iowa), 
supra, 298 N.W. 922, 925 [1-4] .) The reasoning in the 
\V ooster case is equally pertinent here. (See also Adoption 
Pad;er (1948), supra, 31 Cal.2d 608, 617 [9].) 
'rhe so-called "heirship" proceedings in California are not 
limited to those persons who claim to be technical heirs of the 
decedent. Rather, the statute providing for such proceedings 
states that ''any person claiming to be an heir of the decedent 
or entitled to distribution of the estate or any part thereof" 
may institute such proceedings. (Prob. Code, § 1080, italic:;; 
added.) The mere determination of the rights to distribution 
in such a proceeding is not necessarily a determination of 
technical heirship. George petitioned the court for a "De-
rree Determining Interests" in the decedent's estate. The 
eourt determined George's interest, and decreed distribution 
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of the estate to him, not because he was an adopted son of 
decedent, but because he should havr been decedent's adopted 
son, and beeause, under the faets of this ease, he had higher 
equities than any other elaimant. Sueh a deeree did not, nor 
eould it, adjudieate George's status to be other than it 
faetually was-i.e., a stranger to the blood of the deeedent-
and it did not purport to affeet his status for iuheritanee tax 
purposes. 
The order in the instant proeeeding (fixing the inheritanee 
tax) is distinct from that in the heirship proceeding. Each 
order is appealable (Prob. Code, § 1240; see also Attorney 
General v. S'Uperior Court ( 1955), 41 Cal.2d 249, 251 [ 4] 
[259 P .2d 1].) Such orders have "the force and effeet of a 
judgment in a civil aetion" (Hev. & Tax. Code,§ 14672), and 
"the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to 
judgments, new trials, appeals, attachments, and execution of 
judgments, so far as applicable, govern all [such] proceed-
ings ... " (Rev. & 'fax. Code, § 14671.) " [I] n fixing the 
inheritanee tax the probate court may consider matters not 
before it in the distribution of an estate .... The order 
fixing inheritance taxes, which may incidentally determine 
questions in regard to suecession and beneficial ownership, is 
not binding except for tax purposes as between those who 
claim the estate, whether as heirs, legatees, or beneficiaries 
of a trust extrinsic to the will. (In re Lloyd's Estate, 106 
Cal.App. 507 [289 P. 892].)" (Estate of Rath (1937), 10 
Cal.2d 399, 406 [75 P.2d 509, 115 A.L.R. 836].) 'l'he Lloyd 
ease referred to in the Rath opinion recognizes that an in-
heritanee tax proceeding is completely separate from a pro-
ceeding to determine distribution of the estate, and that an 
adjudication of tax status in the one proceeding will not pre-
vent a different adjudication of status with regard to the right 
to take in the distribution proceeding. 'l'he converse is 
equally true where, as here, the distribution proeeeding only 
purports to determine the right to take and not the tax status 
of the one taking. 
The ease of Johnson v. Superior Court (1929), 102 Cal. 
App. 178 [283 P. 331], is not opposed to the principles 
enuneiated herein. The Johnson case merely holds that the 
probate eourt has power to determine the rights of one claim-
ing an interest in the deeedent 's estate by virtue of an execu-
tory contract to adopt. That the probate court has such power, 
and that it exercised such power in the present case, is un-
disputed. But the determination that George was equitably 
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in privity with the estate and therefore entitled to distribu-
tion of the property does not determine in what manner 
George (or the transfer) is to be treated for tax purposes. 
rrhc right to distribution of the estate having been determined, 
the transfer and the transferee became subject to the in-
heritance tax laws. The duly appointed inheritance tax ap-
classified George as a Class D transferee and reported 
the inheritance tax on such classification. The coadmin-
istrators and George filed objections to the appraiser's report 
pursuant to the authorities of section 14510 of the Revenue 
and Taxation Code. At the hearing it was the duty of the 
court to presume that the report of the tax appraiser was 
correct and the burden was upon the objector to proceed in 
support of his objection. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 14512.) The 
inheritance tax authorities in setting the tax were entitled 
to fix George's tax status under the tax laws in accordance 
with the facts as they actually stood. One of those facts was 
the probate decree of distribution, and this the tax author-
ities relied on for exactly what it held-that George, under 
equitable principles, was entitled to take a certain amount of 
property. 'l'he probate decree determined how much property 
George was to take and why he was entitled to it, but did 
not determine in what taxable capacity he was to take it. 
'l'he latter determination was made by the court in this en-
tirely separate and distinct proceeding. Such determination 
is erroneous as a matter of law and should, if the law were 
followed, lead to a reversal. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 10, 
1957. Schaner, .T., and McComb, ,J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
